Why do many philosophers assume that it is beliefs that are most accurately true and false?

What is wrong with this assumption? Explain.Why do many philosophers assume that it is beliefs that are most accurately true and false?
They don't ';assume'; it; they know it. John's assessment is correct and very well put.





But why he correct? These beliefs are called ';justified true beliefs.'; Any other kind is simply opinion, and usually subjective. But there is sufficient objectivity in a ';justified true belief'; to make the one who believes it act upon it in the manner of acting with ';knowledge.';





That is because of the ';justification.';


p is true;


S believes that p;


S is justified in believing that p.


http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowle鈥?/a>





How do we come to know that ';p is true';, especially in cases of logic rather than hard science? The Correspondence Theory of Truth tells us that ';a thing'; cannot be A and not-A, both at the same time and in the same respect. (A may be not-A in a different respect, or at a different time.)





So we choose a rational explanation for ';things'; that doesn't cause a contradiction between what that thing ';is'; in this respect, or at that time.





Therefore, the Law of (Non) Contradiction also comes into play. If we see no contradiction, and if logic seems to prevail about the ';thing'; being ';this thing'; and not ';another thing'; instead, we are justified in believing it to be truth.Why do many philosophers assume that it is beliefs that are most accurately true and false?
Philosophers reason from a premise. If they reason carefully and their premise is an accurate assumption, then they have confidence in their argument; that is, they believe their argument is valid and their premise is accurate. No philosopher should ';believe'; that what they say is ';true'; or false'; except insofar as it corresponds with their assumption.





Philosophy is judged by the weight of the well reasoned correlates of a given assumption or premise. If the premise is nonsense, then no matter how well-reasoned, any correlates to the premise are nonsense. It's like saying that all of the Easter Bunny's relatives are as real as he is.
Ah, intriguing question. The question of the ';truth bearer.'; If I understand you rightly, some of the other answerers have missed the point. So let us be explicit.





Knowledge might be defined as ';justified true BELIEF,'; in which case we are using belief, the noun to which those adjectives attach themselves, as the ';truth bearer.';





In the alternative, though, knowledge might be defined as the set of justified true sentences. So it is a SENTENCE -- something spoken or written in a natural language -- that bears truth on this presumption, not something more subjective such as a ';belief.';





Another alternative. Knowledge might me a justified true PROPOSITION. A proposition is generally understood as less subjective than a belief but more abstract than a sentence.





So your question is: among these choices, why is ';belief'; the most popular?





My own view: this is part of a broader rejection of nominalism. If the primary bearer of truth is a sentence, then it is something qute concrete -- this scribbling on this page. And if that is the case, perhaps it is true (as a confirmed nominalist would contend) that all abstractions can be cut out of our world-view by Ockham's razors. As it happens, though, that program has come into general disfavor, and the belief in ';belief'; as the truth bearer is part of the rejection of nominalism.





I hope this helps.





One ancillary consideration: some mavericks contend that anything, even a banana, can be a truth bearer. This is radically nominalistic than the reliance upon sentences. For the banana argument, see the link below.
The assumption fails at the point at which anyone knows what the definition is of ';many philosophers';.